Investigations of serious incidents completed

January 20, 2017

In October last year a well control incident occurred on the Troll field, in addition to a hydrogen leak in part of the plant at the Mongstad refinery.

On Saturday 15 October a serious well control incident occurred during well plugging by the mobile rig Songa Endurance at the Troll field.

During surface maintenance on Tuesday 25 October a hydrogen leak occurred due to external corrosion of a pipe socket at the Mongstad processing complex.

Nobody was injured in the incidents. Statoil’s internal investigation unit has studied the incidents thoroughly, in addition to the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway. 

“We are taking both these incidents seriously. Openness is vital to our safety work, and the investigation reports are important contributions for us to learn from the incidents. If we are to make the right decisions and carry out the right measures we need to get everything on the table,” says Margareth Øvrum, executive vice president for Technology, Projects and Drilling in Statoil. 

Margareth Øvrum, EVP, TPD
Margareth Øvrum, EVP, TPD

Songa Endurance well control incident

The well control incident led to a gas leak that pushed seawater more than 30 metres up the derrick, before the well was closed by the annular preventer inside the blowout preventer (BOP) about one minute later.

Statoil’s internal investigation defines the incident to have a high degree of seriousness, and concludes that at worst it could have led to loss of life if the safety equipment had failed to function as intended, or if the gas had been ignited. The BOP was quickly activated and stopped the gas leak, and five gas detectors automatically turned off equipment that could have produced sparks.

The investigation report concludes that two main findings have weakened the barriers and helped gas reach the drill floor.

The first finding revealed that existing downhole valves were used as barriers against the reservoir and were unintentionally opened.

The other main finding is related to the annular preventer inside the BOP that should have been closed before the operation was started, because it was not possible to measure the pressure below the wellhead sealing. 


After the incident some immediate actions were taken to ensure that the downhole valves are not used as barriers, and a deeply set plug was reintroduced as a barrier during use of vertical Christmas trees. The investigation report points out several other actions that are currently being taken:

“This is a very serious well control incident. The actions taken will improve our ability to assess risk, both before and during operations. We will share our experience from this incident with the rest of the industry,” says Øvrum. 

Mongstad hydrogen leak

During pipe inspection in connection with surface maintenance in the isomerization plant at Mongstad, a portable gas detector was triggered close to a valve. When an attempt was made to close the valve, the pipe socket broke and high-pressure hydrogen-rich gas was released.

Two people were in the vicinity when the incident occurred. The evacuation alarm was activated immediately, followed by evacuation of employees, shutdown of the facility involved and pressure relief to flare. After about one hour the situation was clarified.

The investigation points to external corrosion as the triggering cause. Wrong prioritisation of maintenance as a result of insufficient risk understanding was identified as root causes. The report concludes that the incident was serious and at worst it could have led to loss of life. 


It has been decided to intensify the programme surface maintenance over the next two years. Safety management will furthermore be improved by increased management presence at the plant. New detection technology will be considered to improve our ability to detect leaks.

“We are intensifying the activity to handle risk related to corrosion under insulation at Mongstad. In addition, we are implementing measures to improve interaction and involvement in connection with maintenance and any findings. The threshold must be low for asking risk-related questions and implementing required measures,” says Jens Økland, executive vice president for Marketing, Midstream and Processing (MMP) of Statoil.  

Jens Økland
Jens Økland, EVP, MMP